28 July 2017 Republic of Poland Rating Report



Credit strengths


- Strong economic fundamentals
- Favourable financing conditions
- Adequate external buffers
- Credible public finance framework

Credit weaknesses

- High reliance on capital inflows
- Growing budgetary pressures
- Political uncertainties
- Demographic headwinds

Rating rationale and Outlook: Poland's upgrade to A+ ratings is underpinned by the country's resilient economy, close integration within the EU, favourable financing conditions and high credibility of its monetary and public finance policy frameworks. The rating upgrade reflects Scope's assessment of (1) Poland's improving economic prospects, along with higher absorption of EU structural funds; (2) reduced current account vulnerabilities and increasing external resilience. The Stable Outlook reflects Scope's view that the risks for the ratings remain broadly balanced.

Figure 1: Summary of sovereign rating categories



Positive rating-change drivers

- Improvement of growth potential
- More efficient absorption of EU funds
- Improving fiscal performance

Negative rating-change drivers

- Protracted period of slow growth
- Worsening investor sentiment
- Fiscal slippages
- Escalating political conflicts with EU

Ratings & Outlook

Foreian currency

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Long-term issuer	
rating	A+/Stable
Senior unsecured debt	A+/Stable
Short-term issuer	S-1+/Stable
rating	
Local currency	
Long-term issuer	
rating	A+/Stable
Senior unsecured debt	A+/Stable

S-1+/Stable

Lead Analyst

Short-term issuer

rating

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Bloomberg: SCOP



Robust growth

Rating Report

Domestic economic risk

Poland belongs to the fastest-growing economies in the EU (average annual real GDP growth of 3.8% during 2006-2016) with very low economic and financial volatility. The Polish economy remained on a sustainable growth path in 2016 despite some moderation. Real GDP growth slowed to 2.7% in 2016, down from 3.8% in 2015, mainly because of weak investment.

Investment stalled in 2016 Investment contributed negatively to GDP growth in 2016 due to temporary effects from the lower absorption of EU structural funds during transition to the new 2014-2020 EU financial period (the same pattern can be observed for the whole CEE region). In addition, frequent political initiatives regarding sectoral taxation weighed on profitability and planning reliability in general, exacerbated by additional burdens on the domestic banking sector. This has dampened investment spending. However, some of the controversial policy initiatives in 2016 either were withdrawn or had no material negative impact on economic performance.

Trend towards higher During the second half of 2016, private consumption expanded strongly compared to the consumption previous year. The trend towards higher consumption accelerated after the adoption of new social benefits for families (a flagship programme of the new government) in April 2016. The labour market continues to tighten, with the unemployment rate falling to a historical low of 6.1% in 2016, which pressures wages higher.

Strengthened growth outlook Polish real GDP growth is closely related to inflows from EU budget funds and the performance of projects financed from EU budget funds. These funds stalled in 2016 but have been recovering since the end of last year. Going forward, the continued solid expansion of private consumption, low real interest rates, growing business confidence, together with a recovery in investment along with higher absorption of EU funds will lead to an acceleration in real GDP growth, likely to exceed 3.5% in 2017, before slowing slightly over the medium term. Exports are projected to rise considerably in 2017 driven by higher external demand, while robust private consumption is set to boost import demand, resulting in a broadly neutral growth contribution from net exports.

Figure 2: Contributions to real GDP growth




Table of Contents

Domestic economic risk2						
Public finance risk4						
External economic risk6						
Financial stability risk7						
Institutional and political risk8						
I. Appendix: CVS and QS Results 10						
II. Appendix: CVS and QS Results11						
III. Appendix: Peer Comparison 12						
IV. Appendix: Statistical Tables 13						
V. Regulatory disclosures14						


Source: IMF, OECD, calculations Scope Ratings AG



Going forward, investment sentiment will receive a further boost from supportive monetary policy. Twelve-month inflation turned positive at the end of 2016, after more than two years of falling prices. The central bank intends to keep its key policy rate unchanged at 1.5% until at least the end of this year while inflation is set to increase close to the bank's inflation target of 2.5% in the second half of 2017, thus increasing the risk of inflationary pressures, exchange rate volatility, negative real interest rates and resulting potential misallocations of credit and EU funds.

Overall, the credibility of the monetary policy framework in Poland is high. Monetary policy was relatively conservative from 2014 to 2016, when real interest rates were 2-3%. It is Scope's view that the decision to keep rates unchanged is in line with central bank policy, which has often ignored temporary deviations from its inflation target and focused more on financial stability. Scope expects key policy rate increases to be postponed until the country's weak credit demand levels (in particular for corporate loans) revive, buoyed up by the higher absorption of EU funds.

Figure 3: Annual inflation rate vs key policy rate



Subdued long-term prospects

Source: Poland Ministry of Finance


While the short- to medium-term economic growth outlook remains strong, long-term growth prospects are more subdued, given demographic headwinds, low private investment and slow productivity growth. The working-age population has been falling by 1% annually since 2012, with the result steadily rising skilled labour shortages. The labour participation rate has remained at 56% since 2012, which is low, and is likely to decline further in view of the reduction in the retirement age, to gradually take effect from Q4 2017 on (a further flagship programme).

The government is committed to implementing structural reforms to boost productivity, private investment and labour force participation, which would help increase potential GDP growth and continue the process of convergence with EU living standards. Despite the substantial rise in Polish real wages, they still remain considerably lower than those of other EU countries. This price-competitiveness in combination with a large domestic market, strategically situated in the CEE region, strong economic and financial links within the EU, including close integration into the German supply chain, and very high availability of EU structural funds (in particular for infrastructure upgrades) will continue to attract foreign direct investments.



Public finance risk

The general government deficit decreased to -2.4% of GDP from -2.6% of GDP in 2015 (the primary deficit decreased from -0.8% of GDP to -0.7%). The reduction in deficits was mainly the result of a substantial drop in public investment and, to a lesser extent, improved tax collection. The largest increase in expenditure was due to higher annual social expenses. Long-term budgetary pressures are increasing as the government has raised spending on higher pensions, child benefits and public sector salaries. Although this year's fiscal stance is roughly neutral, the budget deficit is expected to widen to 2.9% of GDP in 2017 due to rising social benefits. The government is committed to maintaining a deficit below 3% of GDP and starting fiscal consolidation in 2018.



Source: IMF

Increasing budgetary pressures

Moderate debt level

Constitutional debt brake in place

It is Scope's view that budgetary planning has become more challenging since the end of 2015. In order to meet the widened budget deficit target of -2.9% of GDP in 2017, the government decided to postpone the reduction in the VAT rate (scheduled for 2017) until at least 2019. Nevertheless, this budgetary target may be difficult to achieve. Scope anticipates a surge in capital expenditure, in particular at the sub-sovereign level, in order to make efficient use of EU structural funds. Increasing social expenditures will no longer be mitigated by a (one-off) transfer of central bank profits of 0.5% of GDP in 2016. In addition, the reversal of the 2013 retirement age increases will come into effect in Q4 2017, equivalent to an annual fiscal cost of 0.5% of GDP from 2018 onwards.

Poland's general government debt increased to PLN 1tn in 2016, equivalent to 54.4% of GDP (up from 51.1% of GDP in 2015). According to the domestic definition, public debt rose by 3.3 percentage points to 52.1% of GDP in 2016. The main differences between the domestic and EU definition of government debt are related to the scope of the public sector (mainly the inclusion in the general government debt of the National Road Fund the vehicle to finance infrastructure).


Scope has a positive view on Poland's constitutional ban on incurring loans and granting guarantees that could cause public debt to exceed 60% of GDP. Poland's Public Finance Act includes a stabilising expenditure rule that incorporates a correction mechanism for adjusting the growth of expenditures should the public-debt-to-GDP ratio exceed 43% and 48% thresholds and additional prudential procedures in case public debt-to-GDP breaches a 55% limit. The Minister of Finance is obliged to present a four-year debt management strategy for the public finance sector. The strategy must be approved annually by parliament.

Poland's public debt strategy includes forecasts of macroeconomic indicators. Scope has compared the general government debt-to-GDP projections from the IMF (WEO April




Republic of Poland

2017, projection period until 2022) with the projections according to the debt management strategy (projection period until 2020). Scope also implemented a 'weak performance scenario' in which the underlying IMF assumptions were stressed.







Source: Calculations Scope Ratings AG

Source: Calculations Scope Ratings AG

	Real GDP growth (% change)	Primary balance (% of GDP)	Real implicit interest rate (%)
IMF baseline (WEO Apr. '17) 2017 - 2022	3.0	-0.8	0.7
Ministry of Finance projections 2017 - 2020	3.8	n.d.	n.d.
Weak performance scenario 2017 - 2022	2.4	-1.4	0.7

Source: IMF, Ministry of Finance, Calculations Scope Ratings AG

Scope assesses Poland's public debt dynamics as adequate because of their relative Adequate public debt dynamics robustness across a number of plausible scenarios over the projection period to 2022 (Figure 7) and in view of the constitutional public debt brake mechanism. Poland benefits from robust economic growth and low financing costs, which more than offset the relatively small but sustained debt-increasing effect of negative primary fiscal results (Figure 6). External risks could threaten Poland's public debt dynamics, given its sizeable external financing needs, without placing public debt dynamics on an unsustainable trajectory. A protracted growth slowdown or banking sector stress in the euro area, Brexit-related risks and increased volatility in international financial markets could have negative spillovers via trade, financial and confidence channels.

Strategic debt management The Polish public debt strategy framework for 2017 to 2020 also includes targets for targets are met public debt management, which were met in 2016. According to the strategy: (1) the domestic market must remain the main source of finance for state budget borrowing requirements; (2) the average maturity of domestic debt must be maintained at a level of no less than four years, with the aim of achieving an ultimate level of 4.5 years; (3) the overall average time to maturity should be approximately five years, and; (4) the state debt share of foreign-currency-denominated debt should be reduced to below 30%, with the pace depending on market and budgetary conditions.



In fact: the (1) financing of borrowing requirements was predominantly realised on the domestic market (80.5%) in 2016; (2) average time to maturity of domestic state debt increased from 4.27 years at the end of 2015 to 4.48 years by end-May 2017; (3) overall average time to maturity amounted to 5.27 years in May 2017, and; (4) the foreign-currency-denominated debt share of state debt decreased from 34.9% in 2015 to 34.4% in 2016 (and reached 31.2% in May 2017). Poland anticipates that it will meet its target (of <30%) by the end of 2019. In addition, Poland intends to maintain a strategic share of euro-denominated debt in its foreign-currency debt basket of at least 70%, with possible temporary deviations in the event of unfavourable market conditions.

Poland benefits from significant international investor interest, in particular for long-term

maturities. The average time to maturity of foreign debt increased from 6.88 years in 2015 to 6.92 years in 2016. In April 2016, the Ministry of Finance reopened 20-year bond issuances. EUR 750m was issued and priced at a level of 100bp over the mid-swap rate. In October 2016, another two tranches of euro-denominated bonds maturing in 2028 (EUR 750m) and 2046 (EUR 500m) were issued at low rates. In December 2016, Poland was the first sovereign issuer to sell green bonds, from which the proceeds are to be

The net borrowing requirements of the state budget in 2016 amounted to PLN 57.1bn,

which was PLN 26.5bn lower than projected mainly due to a lower state budget deficit

and a consolidation of deposits from public-sector entities as part of liquidity management. The obligation to place court deposits and liquid funds from certain public sector entities within the Ministry of Finance was implemented in May 2011 and broadened in January 2015. Between 2011 and 2016, this mechanism reduced borrowing requirements by about PLN 40bn and public debt by PLN 33bn while the amount of

spent on environmental projects.

Significant international investor demand

Moderate borrowing requirements thanks to centralised liquidity mechanism

Stable capital inflows

External economic risk External economic risks are currently at a low level in historic terms. In 2016, the current account deficit narrowed slightly to -0.3% of GDP, down from -0.6% of GDP in 2015. Poland's regular current account deficits are due to the negative primary income

deposited funds stood at ca. PLN 40bn at the end of 2016.

component, mainly reflecting foreign direct investors' income outflows.

It is Scope's view that Poland's current account vulnerabilities are moderate because of the high quality of funding sources for external debt. Sizeable portions of Poland's persistent current account deficits are covered by long-term capital inflows in the form of foreign direct investments, intra-company loans and EU structural funds, thus exposing the country less to capital flight during periods of financial market turbulence.

Scope forecasts that the current account deficit will remain at present levels. Exports are expected to grow, given improvement in global economic conditions and stability in Poland's main trading partners (80% of Polish trade is conducted with other EU countries, with Germany being the biggest trading partner by far). However, this positive development may be offset by increasing private consumption and thus, imports.







Figure 8: Current account balance, as % of GDP

Improved external robustness

Official foreign exchange reserves increased by EUR 21bn to EUR 108bn in 2016 and remain adequate, covering around 6 months of imports of goods and services or 214% of short-term external debt. Another precautionary buffer against potential external shocks is the prolonged Flexible Credit Line (FCL) arrangement with the IMF. In January 2017, a new two-year EUR 8.2bn FCL was approved, a reduced programme compared with Poland's first FCL arrangement of EUR 20.6bn in 2009 when reserve adequacy was critical. This reflects an improved external robustness of the Polish economy. It is Scope's view that the FCL provides valuable insurance against external shocks, supplementing Poland's flexible exchange rate and high reserves. In addition, Poland also benefits from a swap line with the Swiss National Bank.

Figure 9: Official reserves vs short-term debt (USD m)



Financial stability risk

Healthy banking sector

Overall, Poland's banking sector remains well capitalised and liquid (with a Tier 1 capital ratio of 15.4% in 2016), with strong deposit growth. The non-performing-loan ratio



Rating Report

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New bank asset tax Banks have successfully absorbed the new bank asset tax (effective since February 2016), which collected PLN 3.5bn in 2016. This was less than the PLN 5.5bn budgeted, and, at 0.2% of GDP, less stringent than the bank tax in Hungary that raised 0.7% of GDP in 2011. The asset tax has induced banks to significantly increase holdings of government bonds, which are excluded from the tax base. Minor modifications are under consideration. However, the central bank believes that there has only been a limited effect on banking sector soundness or credit supply so far.

Weak demand for credit Demand for credit weakened in 2016, particularly in the corporate sector, as firms withdrew major investment programmes amid political uncertainty and a lack of co-financing from EU funds. Household borrowing in domestic currency remains robust, increasing by 10% in 2016, while loans denominated in foreign currencies continued to shrink at a rate of -5% at the end of 2016. Scope expects credit demand to rise sharply, in particular in the corporate sector, related to the increasing absorption of EU funds.

New approach for Forex mortgages Before the 2015 elections, politicians in the ruling Law and Justice party (PiS) had called for a conversion of Forex mortgages to zloty at the exchange rates they were taken out at and with banks bearing the cost. PiS backed down after estimates from the financial regulator and central bank demonstrated that such a transaction would destabilise the financial system. The original proposal for a mandatory conversion of Forex mortgages has been replaced with a scheme requiring banks to repay 'excessive' spreads unfairly charged to mortgage borrowers. The potential cost of this is estimated at PLN 4-9bn, much lower than the PLN 67bn cost of mandatory conversion (which would have been equivalent to 3.7% of GDP in 2015 or six times the annual banking sector profits).

The Financial Stability Committee has recently recommended a new rule that raises the risk weight of Polish banks' exposure to Forex mortgages used for calculating their capital adequacy to 150% from 100%, thus incentivising banks to convert Forex mortgages into PLN voluntarily and over time. Overall, recent proposals point to a final solution that will ease financial stability risks and facilitate the required credit supply through enabling domestic banks to offer beneficial terms for the obligatory co-financing of highly available EU funds.

Institutional and political risk

The centre-right single-party majority government (PiS, Law and Justice Party) has been in office since November 2015 and has implemented several election promises, including a new child benefit and a reduction in the retirement age to 60 years for women and 65 for men, to be gradually rolled in starting the end of 2017.

Ongoing political and policy uncertainty is set to continue. The government has controversially placed government-loyal judges on Poland's constitutional court and is planning to do so with other courts. Tensions with the EU over the "Rule of Law" procedure issued by the European Commission are ongoing, and the risk of sanctioning mechanisms (which would result in a reduction in EU voting rights and/or sanctions) has not dissipated. Scope does not expect tensions with the EU and recent policy initiatives to have a material negative effect on economic conditions.

Policy uncertainties



Methodology

The methodology applicable for this rating and/or rating outlook "Public Finance Sovereign Ratings" is available on www.scoperatings.com.

Historical default rates of Scope Ratings can be viewed in the rating performance report on https://www.scoperatings.com/governance-and-policies/regulatory/esma-registration. Please also refer to the central platform (CEREP) of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA): http://cerep.esma.europa.eu/cerepweb/statistics/defaults.xhtml. A comprehensive clarification of Scope's definition of default, definitions of rating notations can be found in Scope's public Credit Rating methodologies on www.scoperatings.com.

The rating outlook indicates the most likely direction of the rating if the rating were to change within the next 12 to 18 months. A rating change is, however, not automatically ensured.



I. Appendix: CVS and QS Results

Sovereign rating scorecards

Scope's Core Variable Scorecard (CVS), which is based on relative rankings of key sovereign credit fundamentals, signals an indicative "A" (a) rating range for the Republic of Poland. This indicative rating range can be adjusted by the Qualitative Scorecard (QS) by up to three notches depending on the size of relative credit strengths or weaknesses versus peers based on analysts' qualitative analysis.

For Republic of Poland the following relative credit strengths are identified: 1) growth potential of the economy, 2) economic policy framework, 3) market access and funding sources. Relative credit weaknesses are signaled for: 1) vulnerability to short-term shocks and 2) recent events and policy decisions. Combined relative credit strengths and weaknesses generate no adjustment and signal a sovereign rating at "A+" for Poland. A rating committee discussed and confirmed these results.

Rating overview	
CVS category rating range	а
QS adjustment	A+
Final rating	A+

To calculate the rating score within the CVS, Scope uses a minimum-maximum algorithm to determine a rating score for each of the 22 indicators. Scope calculates the minimum and maximum of each rating indicator and places each sovereign within this range. Sovereigns with the strongest results for each rating indicator receive the highest rating score; sovereigns with the weakest results receive the lowest rating score. The score result translates to an indicative rating range that is always presented in lower case rating notes.

Within the QS assessment the analyst conducts a comprehensive review of the qualitative factors. This includes but is not limited to economic scenario analysis, review of debt sustainability, fiscal and financial performance and policy implementation assessments.

There are three assessments per category for a total of fifteen. For each assessment, the analyst examines the relative position of a given sovereign within its peer group. For this purpose, additional comparative analysis beyond the variables included in the CVS is conducted. These assessments are then aggregated using the same weighting system as in the CVS.

The result is the implied QS notch adjustment which is the basis for the analyst recommendation to the rating committee.



II. Appendix: CVS and QS Results

CVS				QS			
	Category	Maximum adjustment = 3 notches					
ating indicator	weight		+2 notch	+1 notch	0 notch	-1 notch	-2 notch
Domestic economic risk	35%	Growth potential of the economy	Excellent outlook, strong growth potential	Strong outlook, good growth potential	🔿 Neutral	Weak outlook, growth potential under trend	Very weak outloo grow th potential under trend or negative
Economic growth Real GDP growth Real GDP volatility GDP per capita Inflation rate		Economic policy framework	• Excellent	• Good	O Neutral	O Poor	Inadequate
Labour & population		Macroeconomic stability and imbalances	O Excellent	O Good	Neutral	O Poor	Inadequate
Unemployment rate Population growth							
Public finance risk	30%	Fiscal performance	• Exceptionally strong	g O Strong	Neutral	O Weak performance	• Problematic performance
Fiscal balance GG public balance GG primary balance GG gross financing needs		Debt sustainability	Exceptionally strong	Strong sustainability	Neutral	- Weak sustainability	• • Not sustainable
Public debt			Sustamability	sustainability		Sustamability	
GG net debt		Market access and funding sources	O Excellent access	• Very good access	O Neutral	O Poor access	• Very weak acces
Interest payments External economic risk	15%	Current account vulnerabilities		~	~	_	
International position International investment position			O Excellent	O Good	Neutral	O Poor	Inadequate
Importance of currency Current-account financing Current-account balance		External debt sustainability	• Excellent	O Good	Neutral	O Poor	Inadequate
T-W effective exch. rate		Vulnerability to short-term shocks	• Excellentresilience	 Good resilience 	O Neutral	Vulnerableto shock	• Strongly vulner to shocks
Total external debt			1				
Institutional and political risk Control of corruption	10%	Perceived willingness to pay	O Excellent	O Good	Neutral	O Poor	Inadequate
Voice & accountability		Recent events and policy decisions	O Excellent	O Good	O Neutral	• Poor	O Inadequate
Rule of law		Geo-political risk	O Excellent	O Good	Neutral	O Poor	Inadequate
Financial risk	10%	Financial sector performance	O Excellent	O Good	• Neutral	O Poor	Inadequate
Non-performing loans Liquid assets		Financial sector oversight and governance	O Excellent	O Good	Neutral	O Poor	Inadequate
Credit-to-GDP gap		Macro-financial vulnerabilities and fragility	O Excellent	O Good	• Neutral	O Poor	O Inadequate
ndicative rating range	a	* Implied QS notch adjustment = ((Risk)*0.30 + (QS notch adjustment notch adjustment for Financial Sta	for External Economic				
S adjustment	A+	noton aujustment for rindificial Sta	Sincy AISK/ U.IU				
Final rating	A+						

Source: Scope Ratings AG


Foreign- versus local-currency ratings

Scope sees no evidence that Poland would differentiate among any of its contractual debt obligations based on currency denomination. Poland's public debt is predominantly issued in domestic currency while a third of public debt is in foreign currency, mainly in euros. Poland has an established history of open capital accounts and local-currency debt issuance, which does not provide for a rating bias in favour of either local-currency or foreign-currency debt.




III. Appendix: Peer Comparison

Figure 10: Real GDP growth




Source: IMF, Calculations Scope Ratings AG







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
Figure 14: General government gross debt, % of GDP






Source: IMF, Calculations Scope Ratings AG





Source: IMF, Calculations Scope Ratings AG

Figure 15: Current-account balance, % of GDP





Rating Report

IV. Appendix: Statistical tables

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017E	2018F
Economic performance							
Nominal GDP (PLZ bn)	1,629.4	1,656.8	1,719.7	1,798.3	1,844.3	1,934.2	2,049.6
Population ('000s)	38,317.4	38,309.5	38,293.1	38,265.2	38,224.4	38,170.7	38,104.8
GDP-per-capita PPP (USD)	23,832.7	24,718.5	25,707.5	26,855.8	27,810.5	-	-
GDP per capita (PLZ)	42,806.9	43,529.5	45,234.1	47,316.7	48,577.2	50,953.9	54,011.1
Real GDP growth, % change	1.6	1.4	3.3	3.9	2.8	3.5	3.2
GDP growth volatility (10-year rolling SD)	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.7	1.1	1.1
CPI, % change	3.70	0.90	-0.03	-0.93	-0.58	2.32	2.35
Unemployment rate (%)	10.1	10.3	9.0	7.5	6.1	5.5	5.3
Investment (% of GDP)	21.0	19.0	20.4	20.4	19.6	20.0	20.3
Gross national savings (% of GDP)	17.3	17.7	18.3	19.8	19.3	18.3	18.5
Public finances							
Net lending/borrowing (% of GDP)	-3.7	-4.1	-3.4	-2.6	-2.4	-2.9	-2.6
Primary net lending/borrowing (% of GDP)	-1.0	-1.5	-1.5	-0.8	-0.7	-1.2	-0.9
Revenue (% of GDP)	39.0	38.4	38.7	38.9	39.3	40.1	40.3
Expenditure (% of GDP)	42.7	42.4	42.1	41.5	41.8	43.0	42.8
Net interest payments (% of GDP)	2.7	2.5	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.6
Net interest payments (% of revenue)	6.8	6.5	5.0	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.1
Gross debt (% of GDP)	53.7	55.7	50.2	51.1	54.2	54.6	54.1
Net debt (% of GDP)	18.6	21.8	14.7	15.9	20.0	21.4	21.9
Gross debt (% of revenue)	137.5	145.1	129.9	131.3	137.9	136.2	134.3
External vulnerability							
Gross external debt (% of GDP)	72.1	70.5	71.2	70.2	75.2	-	-
Net external debt (% of GDP)	35.6	37.1	37.5	35.5	32.3	-	-
Current-account balance (% of GDP)	-3.7	-1.3	-2.1	-0.6	-0.3	-1.7	-1.8
Trade balance [FOB] (% of GDP)	-	-0.1	-0.8	0.5	0.5	-0.5	-1.0
Net direct investment (% of GDP)	-1.2	-0.8	-2.4	-2.1	-0.9	-	-
Official forex reserves (EOP, USD m)	96,112.5	93,973.4	94,074.4	89,431.0	109,513.1	-	-
REER, % change	-2.5%	0.2%	0.9%	-2.1%	-3.5%	-	-
Nominal exchange rate (EOP, USD/PLZ)	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	-	-
Financial stability							
Non-performing loans (% of total loans)	5.2	5.0	4.8	4.3	4.0	-	-
Tier 1 ratio (%)	13.1	14.0	13.7	14.5	15.4	-	-
Consolidated private debt (% of GDP)	73.4	75.4	78.1	78.7	81.8	-	-
Domestic credit-to-GDP gap (%)	-4.9 Sources: IMF. Eur	-5.3	-5.0	-6.2	-3.5	-	- -

Sources: IMF, European Commission, European Central Bank, World Bank, United Nations, Scope Ratings AG



V. Regulatory disclosures

This credit rating and/or rating outlook is issued by Scope Ratings AG.

Rating prepared by Jakob Suwalski, Lead Analyst

Person responsible for approval of the rating: Karlo Stefan Fuchs, Executive Director

The ratings/outlook were first assigned by Scope as subscription rating in January 2003. The subscription ratings/outlooks were last updated on 05.05.2017.

The senior unsecured debt ratings as well as the short term issuer ratings were assigned by Scope for the first time.

As a "sovereign rating" (as defined in EU CRA Regulation 1060/2009 "EU CRA Regulation"), the ratings on Republic of Poland are subject to certain publication restrictions set out in Art 8a of the EU CRA Regulation, including publication in accordance with a preestablished calendar (see "Sovereign Ratings Calendar of 2017" published on 21.07.2017 on www.scoperatings.com). Under the EU CRA Regulation, deviations from the announced calendar are allowed only in limited circumstances and must be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the reasons for the deviation. In this case, the deviation was due to the recent revision of Scope's Sovereign Rating Methodology and the subsequent placement of ratings under review, in order to conclude the review and disclose ratings in a timely manner, as required by Article 10(1) of the CRA Regulation.

Rating Committee: the main points discussed were (1) Poland's economic outlook, (2) the fiscal performance and debt sustainability, based on a strong and conservative policy framework, (3) external position and vulnerability to short-term shocks, (4) the reliance on foreign direct investment, (5) Recent political developments, (6) peers consideration.

Solicitation, key sources and quality of information

The rating was initiated by Scope and was not requested by the rated entity or its agents. The rated entity and/or its agents did not participate in the ratings process. Scope had no access to accounts, management and/or other relevant internal documents for the rated entity or related third party.

The following material sources of information were used to prepare the credit rating: public domain and third parties. Key sources of information for the rating include: the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Poland, Central Bank of Poland, European Commission, European Central Bank, Statistical Office of the European Communities, IMF, OECD, and Haver Analytics

Scope considers the quality of information available to Scope on the rated entity or instrument to be satisfactory. The information and data supporting Scope's ratings originate from sources Scope considers to be reliable and accurate. Scope does not, however, independently verify the reliability and accuracy of the information and data.

Prior to publication, the rated entity was given the opportunity to review the rating and/or outlook and the principal grounds upon which the credit rating and/or outlook is based. Following that review, the rating was not amended before being issued.

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